Sequence Semantics for Norms and Obligations by Guido Governatori, Francesco Olivieri, Erica Calardo, Antonino Rotolo
  
 
This is the accepted manuscript of the conference paper:  
 
Available online at: http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/DEON00001.pdf 
 
College Publications does not take copyright and authors are free to use their material elsewhere, and even 
to put the book on the web once sales have achieved profitability. http://collegepublications.co.uk/about/ 
Francesco Olivieri - Erica Calardo - Antonino Rotolo - Guido Governatori, Sequence semantics for 
norms and obligations , In DEON2016. The 13th International Conference on Deontic Logic and 
Normative Systems, London, College Publications, 2016, pp.93-108 
 
Sequence Semantics for Norms and Obligations
Guido Governatori1, Francesco Olivieri2
Erica Calardo3 and Antonino Rotolo3
1 Data61, CSIRO, Brisbane, Australia
2 University of Verona, Verona, Italy
3 CIRSFID, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Abstract
This paper presents a new version of the sequence semantics presented at DEON
2014. This new version allows us for a capturing the distinction between logic of
obligations and logic of norms. Several axiom schemata are discussed, while soundness
and completeness results are proved.
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1 Introduction
Most of the work in deontic logic has focused on the study of the concepts of
obligation, permission, prohibition and related notions, but little attention has
been dedicated on how these prescriptions are generated within a normative
system. 1 The general idea of norms is that they describe conditions under
which some behaviours are deemed as ‘legal’. In the simplest case, a behaviour
can be described by an obligation (or a prohibition, or a permission), but often
norms additionally specify what are the consequences of not complying with
them, and what sanctions follow from violations and whether such sanctions
compensate for the violations.
To address the above issues, Governatori and Rotolo [12] presented a Gentzen
style sequent system to describe a non classical operator (⌦) which models
chains of obligations and compensatory obligations. The interpretation of a
chain like a⌦ b⌦ c is that a is obligatory, but if it is violated (i.e., ¬a holds),
then b is the new obligation (and b compensates for the violation of a); again, if
the obligation of b is violated as well, then c is obligatory (and so on).
As we argued in [12, 8], the logic of ⌦ o↵ers a proof-theoretic approach to
normative reasoning (and in particular, CTD reasoning), which, as done by
[18, 17] in the context of Input/Output Logic, follows the principle “no logic of
norms without attention to the normative systems in which they occur” [16].
1 A normative system can be understood as a, possibly hierarchically structured, set of norms
and mechanisms that systematically interplay for deriving deontic prescriptions in force in a
given situation.
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This idea draws inspiration from the pioneering works in [20] and [1], and focuses
on the fact that normative conclusions derive form of norms as interplaying
together in normative systems. Indeed, it is essential in this perspective to
distinguish prescriptive and permissive norms from obligations and permissions
[3, 10]: the latter ones are merely the e↵ects of the application of norms.
While Input/Output approach mainly works by imposing some constraints
on the manipulation of conditional norms, the ⌦-logic uses ⌦-chains to express
the logical structures (norms) that generate actual obligations and permissions.
In [4], we proposed a model-theoretic semantics (called sequence semantics) for
the ⌦-logic, that addresses the problem identified in [7] that a↵ects most of the
existing approaches for the representation of norms, in particular compensatory
obligations, using ‘standard’ possible world semantics. A compensatory obliga-
tion is a sub-class of a contrary-to-duty obligation, where the violation of the
primary obligation is compensated by the fulfilment of the secondary obligation.
Compensatory obligations can be modelled by ⌦-chains. As we have already
discussed, an expression like a⌦ b means that a is obligatory, but its violation is
compensated by b or, in other terms, it is obligatory to do b to compensate the
violation of the obligation of a. Thus, a situation where a does not hold (or ¬a
holds) and b holds is still deemed as a ‘legal’ situation. Accordingly, when we
use a ‘standard’ possible world semantics, there is a deontically accessible world
where ¬a holds, but this implies, according to the usual evaluation conditions
for permission (something is permitted, if there is a deontically accessible world
where it holds), that ¬a is permitted. However, we have the norm modelling
the compensatory obligation that states that a is obligatory (and if it were not,
then there would be no need for b to compensate for such a violation since,
there would be no violation of the obligation of a to begin with). The sequence
semantics solves this problem by establishing that to have an obligation, we
must have a norm generating the obligation itself (where a norm is represented
by an ⌦-chain), and not simply that something is obligatory because it holds in
all the deontically accessible worlds.
The work of the present paper completes the picture in three points.
• We extend sequence semantics and split the treatment of ⌦-chains and
obligations; the intuition is that chains are the generators of obligations and
permissions, we hence semantically separate structures interpreting norms
from those interpreting obligations and permissions.
• We add  -sequences to express ordering among explicit permissions [8]; as
for ⌦, given the chain a  b, we can proceed through the  -chain to obtain
the derivation of Pb. However, permissions cannot be violated. Consequently,
it does not make sense to obtain Pb from a  b and ¬a. Here, the reason to
proceed in the chain is rather that the normative system allows us to prove
O¬a;
• We systematically study several options for the axiomatisation of ⌦ and  .
The layout of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the language of
our logics. In Section 3 we progressively introduce axioms for the deontic oper-
ators to axiomatise more expressive deontic logics with and without interaction
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between the operators, and we discuss some intuition behind the axiomatisation.
In Section 4 we provide the definitions of sequence semantics to cover the case
of weak and strong permission. Soundness and completeness of the various
deontic logic with the novel semantics are proved in Section 5. Finally, a short
discussion of related work and further work (Section 6) concludes the paper.
2 Language
The language consists of a countable set of atomic formulae. Well-formed-
formulae are then defined using the typical Boolean connectives, the n-ary
connectives ⌦ and  , and the modal (deontic) operators O for obligation and
P for permission. The intended reading of ⌦ is that it encodes a sequence of
obligations where each obligation is meant to compensate the violation of the
previous obligation. The intuition behind   is instead meant to model ordered
lists of permissions, i.e., a preference order among di↵erent permissions [8].
Let L be a language consisting of a countable set of propositional letters
Prop = {p1, p2, . . .}, the propositional constant ?, round brackets, the boolean
connective !, the unary operators O and P, the set of n-ary operators ⌦n
for n 2 N+ and the set of n-ary operators  n for n 2 N+. We shall refer
to the language where   does not occur as L⌦, and the language where ⌦
does not occur as L . There is no technical di culty in avoiding that ⌦
and   be binary operators: the reason why we define them as n-ary ones is
mainly conceptual and is meant to exclude the nesting of ⌦- and  -expressions.
Consider a⌦ ¬(b⌦ c)⌦ d. The expression ¬(b⌦ c) means either that b is not
obligatory or that it is so but c does not compensate the violation of Ob. What
does it mean this as a compensation of the violation of Oa? Also, what is the
meaning of a⌦ (b  c)⌦ d?
Definition 2.1 [Well Formed Formulae] Well formed formulae (w↵s) are defined
as follows:
• Any propositional letter p 2 Prop and ? are w↵s;
• If a and b are w↵s, then a! b is a w↵;
• If a is a w↵ and no operator ⌦m,  m, O and P occurs in a, then Oa and Pa
are a w↵;
• If a1, . . . , an are w↵s and no operator ⌦m,  m, O and P occurs in any of
them, then a1 ⌦n · · ·⌦n an and a1  n · · · n an are a w↵, where n 2 N+; 2
• Nothing else is a w↵.
We use WFF to denote the set of well formed formulae.
Other Boolean operators are defined in the standard way, in particular
¬a =def a! ? and > =def ? ! ?.
We use   to refer to either ⌦ or  . Accordingly, we say that any formula
a1   · · ·  an is an  -chain; also the negation of an  -chain is an  -chain. The
formation rules allow us to have  -chains of any (finite) length, and the arity of
2 We use the prefix forms ⌦1a and  1a for the case of n = 1.
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the operator is equal to number of elements in the chain; we thus drop the index
m from  m. Moreover, we use the prefix notation Jni=1 ai for a1   · · ·  an.
3 Logics for ⌦ and  
The aim of this section is to discuss the intuitions behind some principles
governing the behaviour and the interactions of the various deontic operators.
These principles are captured by axioms or inference rules.
3.1 Basic Axiomatisation
In this paper, we assume classical propositional logic, CPC, as the underlying
logic on which all the deontic logics we examine are based.
The first principle is that of syntax independence or, in other terms, that
the deontic operators are closed under logical equivalence. To this end, all the





















Consider the   chain a   b   a   c. If   is ⌦, the meaning of the chain
above is that a is obligatory, but if a is violated (meaning that ¬a holds) then
b is obligatory. If also b is violated, then a becomes obligatory. But we already
know that we will incur in the violation of it, since ¬a holds. Accordingly, we
have the obligation of c. However, this is the meaning of the ⌦-chain: a⌦ b⌦ c.
If   is  , the intuitive reading of a  b  a  c is that a should be permitted
unless (for other reasons) a is forbidden; in such a case b is permitted. However,
if also b is forbidden, then a is permitted. Nevertheless, we have already
established that this is not possible, since a is forbidden, we thus have the
permission of c. Again, this is what is encoded by the  -chain a  b  c.
The above example shows that duplications of formulae in -chains do not
contribute to the meaning of the chains themselves. This motivates us to adopt
the following axioms to remove (resp., introduce) an element from (to) a chain


















ai where aj ⌘ ak, j < k ( -contraction)
The minimal logics resulting from the above axioms and inference rules are
E⌦ when the language is restricted to L⌦, E  for L , and E⌦  for L.
3.2 Deontic Axioms
The logics presented in the previous section are minimal, and besides the
intended deontic reading of the operators, they do not not provide any ‘genuine’
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deontic principle. In the present section, we introduce axioms to model the
relationships between O and P; specifically, the axioms lay down the conditions
under which the various operators are consistent.
The first axiom defines the duality of obligation and permission.
Pa ⌘ ¬O¬a (OP-duality)
This axiom implies the reading of permission as weak permission, i.e., the lack
of the obligation of the contrary.
Oa! Pa (O-P)
Axiom O-P, is the standard D axiom of modal/deontic logic. This axiom can
have di↵erent meanings depending on whether O and P are the dual of each
other. If they are, the axiom is trivially equivalent to the following one:
Oa! ¬O¬a (D-O)
The axiom states the external consistency of a normative system: a normative
system is externally consistent if no formula is obligatory and forbidden at the
same time. If O and P are independent modalities, then Axiom O-P establishes
the consistency between obligations and permissions, while Axiom D-O must
be assumed to guarantee the external consistency of obligations.
Internal consistency of obligation is the property that no obligation is self-
inconsistent; this is expressed by:
¬O? (P-O)
Finally, when obligation and permission are not dual, while the consistency
between obligation and permission is covered by Axiom O-P, we have yet to
cover the consistency between prohibition and permission. To this end, we can
use one direction of the duality, namely:
Oa! ¬P¬a (O¬P)
The axioms we consider hitherto focus on consistency principles for O and P.
The next axioms provide consistency principles for  -chains.
Given that we use classical propositional logic as the underlying logic, it is
not possible that an  -chain and its negation hold at the same time. What
about when  -chains like a  b  c and ¬(a  b) hold. In case   is ⌦, the first
chain states that a is obligatory and its violation is compensated by b, which
in turn is itself obligatory and it is compensated by c. The second expression
states that ‘either it is not the case thata is obligatory, but if it is so, then its
violation is not compensated by b’. Accordingly, the combination of the two
expressions should result in a contradiction (a similar argument can be made
for  -chains). To ensure this, we must assume the following axioms that allow
us to derive, given a chain, all its sub-chains with the same initial element(s).
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ! a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an 1, n   2 (⌦-shortening)
a1   · · ·  an ! a1   · · ·  an 1, n   2 ( -shortening)
While any combination of the axioms presented in this section can be added to
any of the minimal logics of the previous section, we focus on two options that
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we believe are meaningful for the representation of norms. For the first option,
we call the resulting logic D⌦, we consider O and P as dual, and it extends E⌦
with OP-duality, P-O and ⌦-shortening. For the second option, we reject
the duality of O and P, essentially taking the strong permission stance, and
we assume E⌦  plus all axioms presented in this section with the exclusion of
OP-duality. We use D⌦  for the resulting logic.
3.3 Axioms for ⌦ and O
In this section, we address the relationships between ⌦ and O; we thus focus on
axioms for extending D⌦ (though the axioms are suitable for extensions of D⌦ ).
As we have repeatedly argued, ⌦-chains are meant to generate obligations. In
particular, we have seen that the first element of an ⌦-chain is obligatory. This
is formalised by the following axiom:
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ! Oa1. (⌦-O)
Furthermore, we say that if the negation of the first element does not hold, we
can infer the obligation of the second element. Formally
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^ ¬a1 ! Oa2. (1)
Moreover, we argued that we can repeat the same procedure. This leads us
to generalise (1) for the axiom that expresses the detachment principle for
⌦-chains and factual statements about the opposites of the first k elements of
an ⌦-chain.
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^
k<n^
i=1
¬ai ! Oak+1 (O-detachment)
A possible intuition behind this schema is that it can be used to determine
which are the obligations that can be complied with. For example, since ¬a1
holds, then we know that it is no longer possible to comply with the obligation
of a1. In a similar way, we could ask what are the parts of norms which are
e↵ective in a particular situation. In this case, instead of detaching an obligation
we could detach an ⌦-chain. Accordingly, we formulate the following axiom:
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^ ¬a1 ! a2 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an (⌦-detachment)
where a2 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an does non contain a1 or formulae equivalent to it.
Notice that, contrary to what we did for (1), there is no need to generalise
⌦-detachment to a version where we consider the negation of the first k
elements of the ⌦-chain since
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^
k<n^
i=1
¬ai ! ak+1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an (2)
is derivable from k applications of ⌦-detachment; hence, there is no need to
take (2) as an axiom. Furthermore, in case Axiom ⌦-detachment holds, it
is possible to use (1) to detach O from an ⌦-chain instead of O-detachment
which would then be derivable from ⌦-detachment and (1).
The attentive reader will not fail to observe that the above detachment
axioms do not explicitly mention that the negations of the first k elements of
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an ⌦-chain are violations. The next few axioms address this aspect:
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^
k<n^
i=1
(Oai ^ ¬ai)! Oak+1 (O-violation-detachment)
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^ Oa1 ^ ¬a1 ! a2 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an (⌦-violation-detachment)
Axioms O-violation-detachment and ⌦-violation-detachment are the im-
mediate counterpart of Axioms O-detachment and ⌦-detachment just in-
cluding the violation condition in the their antecedent (and we can repeat the
argument about the possible axiom combination for their counterparts).
The question is now what are the di↵erences between the cases with or
without the explicit violations. Suppose, we have the ⌦-chains
a⌦ b ¬a⌦ c
Applying ⌦-O and D-O results in a contradiction. Suppose that a normative
system is equipped with some mechanisms (as it is the case of real life normative
systems) to resolve conflicts like this (maybe, using some form of preferences
over norms). 3 Also, for the sake of the example, the resolution prefers the first
⌦-chain to the second one, and that the first norm has been complied with,
that is a holds. Then, we can ask what the obligations in force are.
On the one hand, one can argue that the norm prescribing the second
⌦-chain is still e↵ective and thus it is able to generate obligations, but since
the first option (¬) would produce a violation, then we can settled for the
second option, and we can hence derive Oc from it. If one subscribes to this
interpretation, then Axioms O-detachment and, eventually, ⌦-detachment
are to be assumed. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that when a norm
overrides other norms, then the norms that are overridden are no longer e↵ective.
Accordingly, in the case under analysis, a is not a violation of the second ⌦-chain,
and then there is no ground to proceed with the derivation of Oc. But, if ¬a
holds instead of a, then we have a violation of the first ⌦-chain: we can apply
⌦-O to conclude Oa, and then O-violation-detachment to obtain Ob. Hence,
the axioms suitable for modelling this intuition are O-violation-detachment
and, eventually, ⌦-violation-detachment in case one wants to derive which
sub-chains are e↵ective after violations.
Notice that the logic of ⌦ was devised to grasp the ideas of violation and
compensation: for this reason, we do not commit to any reading in which,
given a⌦ b, the fact ¬a prevents the derivation of Oa. If this were the case, we
would not have any violation at all. On the contrary, Ob is precisely meant to
compensate for the e↵ects of the non legal situation described by Oa ^ ¬a. To
further illustrate the idea behind compensatory obligations, consider a situation
where ¬a and b hold. Suppose, that you have the norm a ⌦ b. Here, we can
derive the obligations Oa and Ob, the first of which is violated, and such a
3 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the
focus of the paper is to propose which combinations of formulae result in conflicts, the reader
interested in some solutions using the ⌦ -logic can consult [8].
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violation triggers the second obligation, i.e., Ob, whose fulfilment compensates
the violation. Accordingly, the situation, while not ideal, can be still considered
compliant with the norm. Suppose that instead of a⌦ b we have two norms ⌦1a,
and ⌦1b. Similarly, we derive the obligations Oa and Ob. However, Ob does not
depend on having the violation of Oa, nor does it compensate for that violation.
Thus, in the last case, Oa is an obligation that cannot be compensated for, and
Ob is in force even when we comply with Oa.
3.4 Axioms for ⌦,  , O, P
We now turn our attention to the study of the relationships between  -chains
and permissions. The basic Axiom  -P states that the first element of a
permissive chain is a permission.
a1   · · ·  an ! Pa1 ( -P)
As we have seen, the intuitive reading of a  b  c is that a should be permitted,
but if it is not, then b should be permitted and, if even b is not permitted,
then, finally, c should be permitted. Consequently, we formulate the following
axioms for detaching a permission from a permissive chain, and for detaching a
permissive sub-chain.
a1   · · ·  an ^
k<n^
i=1
¬Pai ! Pak+1 (P-detachment)
a1   · · ·  an ^ ¬Pa1 ! a2   · · ·  an ( -detachment)
The considerations we made about the choice of axioms for⌦ and O apply for
the axioms relating P and   as well.
If we assume the obligation-permission and prohibition-permission consis-
tency principles, i.e., Axioms O-P and O¬P, then the axioms in the previous
section and the axioms above su ce to describe the relationships among the
various deontic operators. In absence of such axioms, several variations of the
axioms are possible to maintain consistency between obligations and permissions.
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^ ¬P¬a1 ! Oa1 (3)
a1   · · ·  an ^ ¬O¬a1 ! Pa1. (4)
In the situation where a norm holds while the permission of contrary of the
first element (of the chain) does not, (3) allows us to determine that the
first element is mandatory. Symmetrically, (4) derives the first element of
a permissive chain as a permission whereas its contrary is not mandatory.
Similar combinations can be used for the detachment axioms we have proposed.
For instance, we can integrate the obligation-permission consistency in Axiom
O-violation-detachment to obtain
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an ^
k<n^
i=1
¬ai ^ ¬P¬ak+1 ! Oak+1 (5)
or we integrate the prohibition-permission in (4) resulting in
a1   · · ·  an ^ O¬a1 ! a2   · · ·  an. (6)
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Notice that (3)–(6) (and similar extensions of the various detachment axioms)
are derived when Axioms O-P and O¬P as well as the corresponding detachment
axioms hold.
3.5 Logics
In this paper, we shall prove completeness results for three groups of systems,
as outlined in the table below.
Basic Systems
E⌦ CPC + O-RE + ⌦-RE + ⌦-contraction
E  CPC + P-RE +  -RE +  -contraction
E⌦  E⌦ + E 
Basic Deontic Systems
D⌦ E⌦ + OP-duality + O-P + P-O + ⌦-shortening
D⌦  E⌦  + O-P + P-O + D-O + O¬P + ⌦-shortening +
 -shortening
DO⌦ D⌦ + ⌦-O
Basic Full Deontic System
DOP⌦  D⌦  + ⌦-O
Besides these systems, in Section 5 we shall also analyse systems extending
DOP⌦  with combinations of detachments axioms (including  -P).
4 Sequence Semantics
Sequence semantics is an extension of neighbourhood semantics. The extension
is twofold: (1) we introduce a second neighbourhood-like function, and (2) the
new function generates a set of sequences of sets of possible worlds instead of set
of sets of possible worlds. This extension allows us to provide a clean semantic
representation of  -chains.
Before introducing the semantics, we provide some technical definitions
for the operation of s-zipping , i.e., the removal of repetitions or redundancies
occurring in sequences of sets of worlds. This operation is required to capture
the intuition described for the  -shortening axioms.
Definition 4.1 Let X = hX1, . . . , Xni be such that Xi 2 2W (1  i  n). Y
is s-zipped from X i↵ Y is obtained from X by applying the following operation:
for 1  k  n, if Xj = Xk and j < k, delete Xk from the sequence.
Definition 4.2 A set S of sequences of sets of possible worlds is closed under
s-zipping i↵ if X 2 S, then (i) for all Y such that X is s-zipped from Y , Y 2 S;
and (ii) for all Z such that Z is s-zipped from X, Z 2 S.
Closure under s-zipping essentially determines classes of equivalences for
 -chain based on Axioms ⌦-shortening and  -shortening.
The next three definitions provide the basic sca↵olding for sequence seman-
tics: frame, valuation, and model.
Definition 4.3 A sequence frame is a structure F = hW, C,N i, where
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• W is a non empty set of possible worlds,
• C is a function with signature W ! 2(2W )n such that for every world w, every
X 2 Cw is closed under s-zipping.
• N is a function with signature W ! 22W .
Definition 4.4 A sequence model is a structure M = hF , V i, where
• F is a sequence frame, and
• V is a valuation function, V : Prop ! 2W .
Definition 4.5 The valuation function for a sequence model is a follows:
• usual for atoms and boolean conditions,
• w |=  ni=1ai i↵ hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 Cw,
• w |= 2a i↵ kakV 2 Nw.
Sequence models are meant to be used for the combination of a deontic
operator (in this paper 2 ranges over O and P) and the corresponding  -chain
operator (⌦ and  , respectively). We are going to use sequence models for the
logics where we consider only ⌦ and O, and P is defined as the dual of O.
The next three definitions extend sequences semantics to the case of two
sets of independent combinations of   and the corresponding unary deontic
operator.
Definition 4.6 A bi-sequence frame is a structure F = hW, CO, CP,NO,N Pi,
where
• W is a non empty set of possible worlds;
• CO and CP are two functions with signature W ! 2(2W )n , such that for every
world w 2 W , for every X 2 COw and Y 2 CPw, X and Y are closed under
s-zipping;
• NO and N P are two functions with signature W ! 22W .
Definition 4.7 A bi-sequence model is a structure M = hF , V i, where
• F is a bi-sequence frame, and
• V is a valuation function, V : Prop ! 2W .
Definition 4.8 The valuation function for a bi-sequence model is as follows:
• usual for atoms and boolean conditions,
• w |= a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an i↵ hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw,
• w |= a1   · · ·  an i↵ hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 CPw,
• w |= Oa i↵ kakV 2 NOw ,
• w |= Pa i↵ kakV 2 N Pw .
5 Soundness and Completeness
In this section we study the soundness and completeness of the logics defined in
Section 3.5. Completeness is based on adaptation of the standard Lindenbaum’s
construction for modal (deontic) neighbourhood semantics.
Definition 5.1 [L-maximality] A set w is L-maximal i↵ for any formula a of
L, either a 2 w, or ¬a 2 w.
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Lemma 5.2 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Any consistent set w of formulae in
the language L can be extended to a consistent L-maximal set w+.
Proof. Let a1, a2, . . . be an enumeration of all the possible formulae in L.
• w0 := w;
• wn+1 := wn [ {an} if its closure under the axioms and rules of S is consistent,




5.1 Basic classical systems: E⌦, E 
The construction of a sequence canonical model is as follows.
Definition 5.3 [E⌦-Canonical Models] A sequence canonical model M =
hW, C,N , V i for a system S in the language L⌦ (where S ◆ E⌦) is defined as
follows:
1. W is the set of all the L⌦-maximal consistent sets.
2. For any propositional letter p 2 Prop, kpkV := |p|S, where |p|S := {w 2W |
p 2 w}.
3. Let C := Sw2W Cw, where, for each w 2 W , Cw := {hka1kV , . . . , kankV i |Nn
i=1 ai 2 w}, where each ai is a meta-variable for a Boolean formula.
4. Let N := Sw2W Nw where for each world w, Nw := {kaikV | Oai 2 w}.
Any canonical model for a logic extending E , on the other hand, would
be exactly the same, but for condition (3), to be changed as to read: Let C :=S
w2W Cw, where, for each w 2W , Cw := {hka1kV , . . . , kankV i |
Ln
i=1 ai 2 w},
where each ai is a meta-variable for a Boolean formula.
Lemma 5.4 (Truth Lemma for Canonical Sequence Models) If M =
hW, C,N , V i is canonical for S, where S ◆ E⌦ or S ◆ E , then for any w 2W
and for any formula A, A 2 w i↵ w |= A.
Proof. Given the construction of the canonical model, this proof is easy and
can be given by induction on the length of an expression A. We consider only
some relevant cases.
Assume A has the form a1⌦ · · ·⌦an. If A 2 w, by definition of the canonical
model, then there is a sequence hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 Cw. Following from the
semantic clauses given to evaluate ⌦-formulae, it holds that w |= a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an.
For the opposite direction, assume that w |= a1⌦ · · ·⌦an. By definition, there is
Cw which contains an ordered n-tuple hka1kV , . . . , kankV i and by construction
a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an 2 w. Clearly the same argument holds in the case of operator  .
If, on the other hand, A has the form Ob and Ob 2 w, then kbkV 2 Nw by
construction, and by definition w |= Ob. Conversely, if w |= Ob, then kbkV 2 Nw
and, by construction of N , Ob 2 w. 2
It is easy to verify that the canonical model exists, it is not empty, and
it is a sequence semantics model. Consider any formula A /2 S such that
S ◆ E⌦, S ◆ E ; {¬A} is consistent and it can be extended to a maximal set w
such that for some canonical model, w 2W . By Lemma 5.4, w 6|= A. That Cw
is closed under zipping follows immediately from the Lindembaum construction.
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Corollary 5.5 (Completeness of E⌦ and E ) The systems E⌦ and E  are
sound and complete with respect to the class of sequence frames.
Definition 5.6 [Bi-sequence Canonical Models] A bi-sequence canonical model
M = hW, CO, CP,NO,N P, V i for a system S in L⌦  (where S ◆ E⌦ ) is defined
as follows:
1. W is the set of all the L⌦ -maximal consistent sets.
2. For any propositional letter p 2 Prop, kpkV := |p|S, where |p|S := {w 2W |
p 2 w}.
3. Let CO := Sw2W COw, where for each w 2 W , COw := {hka1kV , . . . , kankV i |Nn
i=1 ai 2 w}, where each ai is a meta-variable for a Boolean formula.
4. Let CP := Sw2W CPw, where for each w 2 W , CPw := {hka1kV , . . . , kankV i |Ln
i=1 ai}, where each ai is a meta-variable for a Boolean formula.
5. Let NO := Sw2W NOw where for each world w, NOw := {kaikV | Oai 2 w}.
6. Let N P := Sw2W N Pw where for each world w, N Pw := {kaikV | Pai 2 w}.
Lemma 5.7 (Truth Lemma for Canonical Bi-sequence Models) If
M = hW, CO, CP,NO,N P, V i is canonical for S, where S ◆ E⌦ , then for any
w 2W and for any formula A, A 2 w i↵ w |= A.
Since the modal operators do not interact with each other, we can state:
Corollary 5.8 (Completeness of E⌦ ) The system E⌦  is sound and com-
plete with respect to the class of bi-sequence frames.
5.2 Deontic Systems
Theorem 5.9 (Completeness of D⌦) The frame of a canonical model for
D⌦, as defined in Definition 5.3, has the following properties. For anyw 2W ,
1. X 2 Nw if and only if  X 62 Nw. (see OP-duality, O-P and D-O)
2. ; 62 Nw (see P-O)
3. hX1, . . . , Xni 2 Cw for n   2 then hX1, . . . , Xn 1i 2 Cw (see ⌦-shortening)
Proof.
1. X 2 Nw i↵ X = kakV for some Oa 2 w, i.e., i↵ ¬O¬a 2 w, O¬a 62 w,
 kakV 62 Nw.
2. Assume by reductio that ; 2 Nw. Then w |= O?, O? 2 w, reaching a
contradiction.
3. Assume hkak1, . . . , kanki 2 Cw. By construction it means that
Nn
i=1 ai 2 w
and by ⌦-shortening, Nn 1i=1 ai 2 w, thus hkak1, . . . , kan 1ki 2 Cw. 2
Theorem 5.10 (Completeness of DO⌦) The frame of a canonical model for
DO⌦ (Definition 5.3) has the properties expressed in Theorem 5.9 and the
following: For any world w, if hX1, . . . , Xni 2 Cw then X1 2 Nw (see ⌦-O)
Proof. If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 Cw , then there are n formulae such that for 1  i  n,
Xi = kaikV and a1 ⌦ · · · ⌦ an 2 w. By Axiom ⌦-O, Oa1 2 w and hence
ka1kV 2 Nw. 2
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Theorem 5.11 (Completeness of D⌦ ) The frame of a canonical model for
D⌦ , as defined in Definition 5.6, has the following properties. For any w 2W ,
1. N Pw ◆ NOw (see O-P)
2. X 2 NOw implies  X 62 NOw (see D-O)
3. ; 62 NOw (see P-O)
4. X 2 NOw implies  X 62 N Pw (see O¬P)
5. hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw for n   2 then hX1, . . . , Xn 1i 2 COw (see ⌦-shortening)
6. hX1, . . . , Xni 2 CPw for n   2 then hX1, . . . , Xn 1i 2 CPw (see  -shortening)
Proof. Recall that D⌦  = E⌦ +O-P+P-O+D-O+O¬P+⌦-shortening+
 -shortening; remember that the operator P is not defined as a dual of O.
1. Assume kakV 2 NOw , then Oa 2 w and, by O-P, Pa 2 w. Hence kakV 2 N Pw .
2. Assume X 2 NOw for some w 2 W , then, by construction, there is some
formula Oa 2 w and X = kakV . By D-O andMP, ¬O¬a 2 w, i.e., O¬a 62 w,
6|=Vw O¬a, k¬akV 62 NOw , hence  kakV 62 NOw .
3. See the proof of Theorem 5.9.
4. Assume X 2 NOw ; by Definition 5.6 X = kakV for some a such that Oa 2 w.
Then, by O¬P, ¬P¬a 2 w, P¬a 62 w, hence kakV 62 N Pw .
5. See the proof of Theorem 5.9.
6. See the proof of Theorem 5.9. 2
5.3 Extended Deontic Systems
In what follows we shall prove completeness results for various systems by
adding 6 detachment schemata that combine the modal operators introduced.
Theorem 5.12 (Completeness of DOP⌦ ) The canonical frame (see Defini-
tion 5.6) for the logic DOP⌦  has the properties stated in Theorem 5.11 plus:
For any world w if hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw then X1 2 NOw (see ⌦-O).
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 5.10. 2
Theorem 5.13 Let S be a system such that S ◆ DOP⌦ . If S contains any of
the axioms listed below, the canonical frame enjoys the corresponding property:
For any world w
1. O-detachment:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw and w 62 Xi for 1  i  k and k < n, then Xk+1 2 NOw .
2. ⌦-detachment:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw and w 62 X1, then hX2, . . . , Xni 2 COw.
3. O-violation-detachment:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw and, for 1  i  k and k < n, w 62 Xi and Xi 2 NOw ,
then Xk+1 2 NOw .
4. ⌦-violation-detachment:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw and X1 2 NOw and w 62 X1, then hX2, . . . , Xni 2 COw.
5.  -P:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 CPw then X1 2 N Pw .
6. P-detachment:
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If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 CPw and Xi 62 N Pw for 1  i  k < n, then Xk+1 2 N Pw .
7.  -detachment:
If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 CPw and Xi 62 N Pw for 1  i  k and k < n, then
hXk+1, . . . , Xni 2 CPw.
Proof. Again, the proof is very straightforward and it follows closely the
syntactical structure of the schemata. Notice that the fact hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw
always implies that for 1  i  n formulae Xi = kaikV .
1. If hX1, . . . , Xni 2 COw and w 62 Xi for 1  i  k with k < n, then for
1  i  n formulae it holds that Xi = kaikV , a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an 2 w, ai 62 w for
1  i  k, hence Vki=1 ¬ai 2 w. Thus, by O-detachment, Oak+1 2 w and
kak+1kV 2 NOw .
2. If hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw and w 62 ka1kV , then a1⌦· · ·⌦an 2 w and ¬a1 2
w, thus, by ⌦-detachment, a2⌦ · · ·⌦an 2 w and hka2kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw.
3. Assume hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw and, for 1  i  k with k < n, w 62 kaikV
and kaikV 2 NOw . Then a1 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an 2 w,
Vk
i=1 ¬ai 2 w, and
Vk
i=1 Oai 2 w.
By classical propositional logic
Vk
i=1(Oai ^ ¬ai) 2 w and, by O-violation-
detachment, Oak+1 2 w and kak+1kV 2 NOw .
4. Assume hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw, w 62 ka1kV , and ka1kV 2 NOw . Then
a1⌦ · · ·⌦an 2 w, ¬a1 2 w and Oa1 2 w and, by ⌦-violation-detachment,
a2 ⌦ · · ·⌦ an 2 w and hka2kV , . . . , kankV i 2 COw.
5. See Theorem 5.10.
6. Assume hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 CPw and, for 1  i  k with k < n, kaikV 62
N Pw . Then a1   · · ·   an 2 w and
Vk
i=1 ¬Pai 2 w and, by P-detachment,
Pak+1 2 w, implying that kak+1kV 2 N Pw .
7. Assume hka1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 CPw and, for 1  i  k with k < n, kaikV 62
N Pw . Then a1   · · ·   an 2 w and
Vk
i=1 ¬Pai 2 w and, by  -detachment,
ak+1   · · ·  an 2 w and hence hkak+1kV , . . . , kankV i 2 CPw. 2
6 Conclusions and Related Work
The deontic logic literature on CTD reasoning is vast. However, two fundamental
mainstreams have emerged as particularly interesting.
A first line of inquiry is mainly semantic-based. Moving from well-known
studies on dyadic obligations, CTD reasoning is interpreted in settings with
ideality or preference orderings on possible worlds or states [15]. The value
of this approach is that the semantic structures involved are rather flexible:
di↵erent deontic logics can thus be obtained. This semantic approach has been
fruitfully renewed in the ‘90s, for instance by [19, 21], and most recently by
works such as [14, 2], which have confirmed the vitality of this line of inquiry.
However, most of these approaches are based on ‘standard’ possible world
semantics with the risk of being a↵ected by the paradox advanced in [7].
While the original systems for ⌦ were mainly motivated by modelling CTD
reasoning [12, 4], in this paper we have broadened our analysis by extending
chains to permissions and by generically dealing with compensations and vi-
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olations. Indeed, we accept di↵erent types of O-detachment, either allowing
for the derivation of all obligations from any ⌦-chain, or only the subsequent
ones in the chains with respect to the ones that have been violated. Our aim
was to provide the semantics analysis for several axioms (principles) for the
novel operators ⌦ and   and how they can be used to generated obligations
and permissions. In this paper, we did not study what combinations of axioms
are suitable to model di↵erent interpretations for di↵erent intuitions for the
various deontic notions. This study is left to future investigations.
The second mainstream is mostly proof-theoretic. Examples, among others,
are various systems springing from Input/Output Logic [18, 17] and the ⌦-logic
originally proposed in [12]. The logic for ⌦ proved to be flexible for several
applied domains, such as in business process modelling [13], normative multi-
agent systems [6, 9], temporal deontic reasoning [11], and reasoning about
di↵erent types of defeasible permission [8].
This paper completes the e↵ort in [4] and o↵ers a systematic semantic study
of the ⌦ and   operators originally introduced in [12] and [8]. We showed that
suitable axiomatisations can be characterised in a class of structures extending
neighbourhood frames with sequences of sets of worlds. In this perspective, our
contribution may o↵er useful insights for establishing connections between the
proof-theoretic and model theoretic approaches to CTD reasoning. Also, we
have shown that the semantic structures can easily keep separate structures
interpreting norms from those interpreting obligations and permissions, thus
mirroring the di↵erence between ⌦ and   operators from O and P.
A number of open research issues are left for future work. Among others, we
plan to explore decidability questions using, for example, the filtration methods.
The fact that neighbourhoods contain sequences of sets of worlds instead of sets
is not expected to make the task significantly harder than the one in standard
neighbourhood semantics for modal logics.
Second, we intend to study richer deontic logic. For example, we could
extend rule RM for O (i.e., a! b/Oa! Ob), this would allow us to determine
that the combination of a⌦ c, b⌦ d, where a! ¬b, results in a contradiction.
In this case, the semantic condition to add is that N is supplemented. Similarly,
we may study what are the   counterpart of axioms like M, C an so on. [5]
shows how to provide a generalisation of rule RM to the case of ⌦.
Third, [9] investigates how to characterise di↵erent degrees and types of
goal-like mental attitudes of agents (including obligation) with chain operators.
We plan to explore the use of sequence semantics to provide axioms (and
corresponding semantic conditions) that correspond to the mechanisms governing
the goal-like attitudes and their interactions.
Finally, we expect to enrich the language and to further explore the meaning
of the nesting of ⌦- and  -expressions, thus having formulae like a⌦¬(b⌦c)⌦d.
As we have said, the meaning of those formulae is not clear. However, a semantic
analysis of them in the sequence semantics can clarify the issue. Indeed, in the
current language we can evaluate in any world w formulae like ¬(a⌦ b), which
semantically means that there is no sequence hkakV , kbkV i 2 COw. Conceptually,
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this means that there is no norm stating that a is obligatory and that the
violation of this primary obligation generates an obligationb. Accordingly, the
truth at w of a ⌦ ¬(b ⌦ c) ⌦ d means that there exists a norm stating that
a is obligatory, but either b does not compensate a or, otherwise, c does not
compensate b, and d compensates what compensates a, whatever it is.
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